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If this Court turns out to be right when, by separate order, it grants
the motion to remand, the court will have come close to proving that the
day of the knee-jerk removal of diversity tort cases from state to federal

court within the three states comprising the Eleventh Circuit came to an
end on April 11, 2007 when Lowery v. Alabama Power Co. was
decided.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A defendant's right to defend his case in federal court is recognized

as a powerful instrument against state court bias. It should therefore
come as no surprise that Congress created the removal process first and
* Eleventh Circuit Editor Elect, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011,
University of Miami School of Law; B.B.A. 2008 Florida International University. First and
foremost, I'd like to thank my parents, Mariela and Tony Fernandez, whose love, support, and
patience made this paper possible. Special thanks to Alex and my insane and loud family for their
constant encouragement throughout the years, especially when my stress level was at an all time
high.
1. Constant v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 487 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1308 (N.D. Ala. 2007).

1473

1474

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1473

foremost to protect defendants. 2 Strategically, removal offers a defendant a potential plethora of tactical and logistical advantages, subject to
the amount in controversy burden. This burden varies, however,
depending on whether the plaintiff pleads a specific jurisdictional
amount in the complaint. If the plaintiff pleads an amount below the
jurisdictional threshold, the defendant must then meet the legal certainty
burden, a more stringent burden because the plaintiff has the primary
right to choose his forum. On the other hand, if the plaintiff fails to plead
a specific jurisdictional amount, the defendant must meet the preponderance of the evidence burden, a more lenient burden since the plaintiff
has, in the first instance, failed to secure a forum choice.
Although the preponderance of the evidence standard is not a difficult burden for defendants to meet, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.4 significantly narrowed a defendant's ability to prove the amount in controversy under
that standard. The new Lowery standard has made it extremely difficult
for defendants to remove to federal court and, as such, draws an increasing similarity to the more stringent legal certainty burden.
This note demonstrates, however, that although the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Lowery closely resembles the stringent legal certainty
burden, recent district court decisions are easing a defendant's removal
burden by moving away from Lowery's strict framework and applying
the more flexible pre-Lowery preponderance of the evidence standard.
Moreover, in doing so, district courts are still justifying their decisions
under Lowery, highlighting an external circuit split and the Eleventh Circuit's own internal disagreement over a proper jurisdictional standard
where the plaintiff fails to plead a specific jurisdictional amount.
To establish this, the second part of this article presents a brief history of removal into federal courts, the amount in controversy burdens,
including both the legal certainty burden and the preponderance of the
evidence burden, and the Eleventh Circuit's application of the preponderance of the evidence standard. The third part discusses Lowery and
the implications that led to the court's adoption of a more stringent preponderance of the evidence standard. The fourth part demonstrates that
although Lowery has been criticized for narrowing defendants' chances
of removal into federal court similar to the legal certainty burden, citing
Lowery, district courts have recently eased defendants' removal burden.
2. Penelope A. Dixon & David J. Walz, Removal After Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.; A
Whole New Bag of Tricks, 26 No. 4 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 39 (2007) (citing Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d
1317, 1325 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
3. Id. at 1.
4. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007).
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This fact emphasizes the uncertainty present within the Eleventh Circuit
as well as other circuits in applying the preponderance of the evidence
standard. Finally, by examining other circuits' successful application of
a uniform preponderance of the evidence standard, the fifth part recommends that although a uniform intra-circuit standard would also be
effective, the Eleventh Circuit can only achieve this by creating a more
helpful preponderance of the evidence standard that benefits defendants'

chances of removal.
I1.BACKGROUND
A.

Removal Generally

Federal court subject matter jurisdiction for diversity of citizenship
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To meet the requirements of the statute, the minimum amount in controversy must be $75,000 and the
opposing parties must be from different states.5 Removal into federal
court finds its basis in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). According to the statute, a
case can be removed to federal court as long as it could have been
brought there in the first place.6 Section 1441(a) also provides that only
defendants may remove a case to federal court.' For instance, under 28
U.S.C. § 1446, a removing defendant must file a removal notice within
thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading setting forth a removable
claim or within thirty days of notification that the action is removable.8
The plaintiff then has thirty days to file a petition for remand.9
One of the most stringent aspects of diversity jurisdiction under
5. Granting jurisdiction when the requisite amount in controversy is more than $75,000 and
is between:
1) citizens of different States; 2) citizens of a State and citizens of subjects of a
foreign state; 3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and 4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a)
of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2007); see 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3611-30 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the rules that determine diversity

of citizenship).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2007); see also Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353,
1356 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("Any civil case filed in state court may be removed by the defendant to
federal court if the case could have been brought originally in federal court.").
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also Sidney Powell & Deborah Pearce-Reggio, The Ins and Outs
of Federal Court: A Practitioner'sGuide to Removal and Remand, 17 Miss. C. L. REV. 227
(1997) (advising defendants to examine practical considerations before removal).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2007).
9. Id. But see Russell D. Jessee, Pleading to Stay in State Court: Forum Control, Federal
Removal Jurisdiction,and the Amount in Controversy Requirement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651
(1999) ("[I1f the district court discovers that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction any time before
final judgment, [28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2007)] requires remand even without a petition from the
plaintiff.").
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Section 1332 is the requirement that diversity be complete.'" As such,
all defendants and plaintiffs must be diverse from each other and no
plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.I Another

important limitation is the fact that diversity jurisdiction cannot be
established if a defendant is sued in his home state.' 2 The basis for these

restrictions rests on the fact that Congress intended diversity jurisdiction
to provide a national forum for out-of-state litigants that would diminish
state court bias in favor of state residents.' 3 For example, when citizens
of one state are on opposite sides of the same lawsuit, the chance of bias

decreases and diversity jurisdiction is no longer justified. The same reasoning applies when the defendant is sued in his home state: the fear of
bias is nonexistent because the defendant is already in a favored forum,

his home state. Diversity jurisdiction is therefore no longer a basis for
removal.
Yet in 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act

("CAFA")'4 and abrogated the long-standing precedent of complete
diversity for class action lawsuits. 5 Congress enacted CAFA after it
found that "[a]buses in class actions undermine the national judicial system" because "[s]tate and local courts are ... keeping cases of national
importance out of Federal court ... ."16 CAFA amended the diversity
statute 7 by giving federal courts jurisdiction over class actions where

(1) any plaintiff is a citizen of a different state from the defendant, (2)
the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and (3) the class action
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Deborah Pearce Reggio, Removal and Remand: A Guide to
Navigating Between the State and Federal Courts, 23 Miss. C. L. REV. 97, 103 (2004).
11. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (highlighting the rule
that diversity jurisdiction is not available when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the same
state); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Galbreath Cattle Co., 271 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1926); AAA Abachman
Enter. Inc., v. Stanley Steemer Int'l. Inc., 268 F. App'x 864 (11 th Cir. 2008); Powell v. Offshore
Nav. Inc. 644 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (5th Cir. 1981) (stressing the importance of complete diversity
in diversity jurisdiction actions).
12. 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) (2007). But see 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that "this limitation is not
applicable to the removal of federal question cases nor to diversity cases filed in federal court by
plaintiffs"); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996); Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S.
663, 664 (1893); Henderson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. 454 F.3d 1278 (11 th Cir. 2006).
13. Powell, 644 F.2d at 1066 (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806)) (noting that a
diversity action is barred unless complete diversity exists between plaintiffs and defendants); see
also 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3605 (4th ed. 2009).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2007).
15. Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the JurisdictionalProvisions of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible JudicialApproach, 59 BAYLOR L. R. 77, 97 (2007).
16. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fairnessto Whom? Perspectives on the Class
Action FairnessAct of2005, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1723, 1733 (2008) (citing S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
12 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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exceeds 100 members.' 8 In general, CAFA's requirements broaden federal diversity jurisdiction by establishing a lower threshold requirement

for diversity jurisdiction and removal.19
Amount in Controversy Burdens

B.

In determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists, a court must
first decide whether the amount in controversy has been met. Under Section 1332, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 exclusive of
interests and costs. 20 On the other hand, under CAFA, the amount in
controversy must exceed $5,000,000 provided the class exceeds 100
members. 2 ' In the removal context, whether pursuant to CAFA or the
general removal statute, the defendant has the burden of proving that the
22
amount in controversy has been met and that federal jurisdiction exists.

The burden of proof the defendant must bear, however, varies depending
on whether the plaintiff has made a demand for damages below the jurisdictional amount-the legal certainty burden-or whether the plaintiff
has pled an unspecified amount of damages-the preponderance of the
evidence burden.2 3
1.

LEGAL CERTAINTY BURDEN

In a typical diversity suit, the plaintiff sues in federal court for more
than the jurisdictional amount.2 4 If the defendant chooses to remove in
this instance, it must meet the legal certainty test, which applies when
25
the plaintiff pleads damages in excess of the amount in controversy.
Discussion of the legal certainty burden begins with St. Paul Mercury
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab 26 where the Supreme Court held that the
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); Lauren D. Fredericks, Removal, Remand, and Other Procedural
Issues Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 995 (2006).
19. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2007).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2007).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
22. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (1lth Cir. 1996); see also Lowery,
483 F.3d at 1211 ("Because CAFA does not disturb the long-established rule that a removing
defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction, upon the plaintiffs' motion to remand
in this case, the defendants bear the burden of establishing the jurisdictional requirements for a
CAFA mass action. Furthermore, because this case involves a complaint for unspecified damages,
the defendants must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.").
23. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1356; Powell & Pearce-Reggio, supra note 7, at 234 (stating that
if the answer is not apparent from the face of the complaint or if a party challenges the amount
demanded, the court can proceed by way of the legal certainty test or the preponderance of the
evidence test).
24. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1994).
25. Powell & Pearce-Reggio, supra note 7, at 236.
26. 303 U.S. 283 (1938); Jessee, supra note 9, at 659; see also De Aguilar v. Boeing, 47 F.3d
1404, 1408-09 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Most discussions of jurisdictional amount in removal cases begin
with St. Paul Mercury.").
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plaintiff's demand controls jurisdiction as long as the plaintiff demanded
that amount in good faith.27 Thus, to justify dismissal from federal court,
the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that the amount the plaintiff
demands is really less than the jurisdictional amount necessary for federal jurisdiction.28
Almost sixty years later in Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co., the
Eleventh Circuit relied on Red Cab in developing the legal certainty

burden for claims below the jurisdictional threshold.2 9 In proving federal
jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant's burden should

be heavy because a plaintiffs right to choose his forum and a defendant's right to remand are not on "equal footing".3 0 As a result, removal
statutes are narrowly construed and, where both plaintiff and defendant

clash over jurisdiction, remand is favored. 3 Further, because a lawyer
has a duty to correctly plead the value of his client's case pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ("FRCP Rule 11"),32 when the
defendant asserts that plaintiff's counsel is incorrectly assessing damages, the court held that the defendant must prove to a legal certainty
that the claim is above the jurisdictional amount.33 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, in deciding whether the defendant has met this
removal burden, the court should ask itself whether "an award below the
jurisdictional amount would be outside the range of permissible awards
because the case is clearly worth more than [the jurisdictional
amount]."34
27. See also Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 290 (In the removal context, "[t]here is a strong
presumption that the plaintiff has not claimed a large amount in order to confer jurisdiction on a
federal court or that the parties have colluded to that end"). See generally 14A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702 (4th ed. 2009)
("Plaintiff is the master of his or her own claim; if plaintiff chooses to ask for less than the
jurisdictional amount, only the sum actually demanded is in controversy.").
28. Jessee, supra note 9, at 661 (citing Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 288-89).
29. Bums, 31 F.3d at 1094.
30. Id. at 1095.
31. Id. (citing Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1990)). See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27 ("Plaintiff is the master of his or her own claim; if plaintiff
chooses to ask for less than the jurisdictional amount, only the sum actually demanded is in
controversy."). But see 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3725 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that the discrepancy in treatment between
plaintiffs and defendants can be justified by the historical tradition that plaintiff is the master of
his complaint "[blut the enactment of Section 1441 suggests that Congress intended this historical
tradition to be replaced by a new regime in which either the plaintiff or the defendant can invoke
the jurisdiction of the federal courts whenever a set of uniformly acceptable jurisdictional
prerequisites is satisfied").
32. Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11 th Cir. 1994); see FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)
(stating that an attorney who presents a document to the court represents that his "legal
contentions are warranted by existing law" or have or will likely have "evidentiary support").
33. Bums, 31 F.3d at 1095.
34. Id. at 1096 (citing Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1990)). The
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PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD

The preponderance of the evidence test, in contrast, applies in the
removal context when the plaintiff fails to plead a certain amount of
damages." Circuit use of the preponderance standard can be traced back
to McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana Inc.36 There,
the Supreme Court found that unless the plaintiff pled all facts essential
to support jurisdiction, jurisdiction was lacking.3" Without providing any
authority for its preponderance of the evidence requirement, the Court
concluded that
If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in an appropriate manner, he must support them by competent
proof. And where they are not so challenged the court may still insist
that the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed,
and for that purpose the court may demand that the party alleging
38
jurisdictionjustify his allegationsby a preponderanceof evidence.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Garza v.
Bettcher Industries39 first applied the McNutt preponderance of the evidence test to a state court complaint that failed to specify a certain
amount of damages. The court held that the legal certainty burden
should not be applied to cases where the plaintiff seeks an unspecified
amount because in many cases, a predetermined set of damages is
impossible to calculate.4 ° Applying the stringent legal certainty burden
to these situations would almost always preclude removal for defendants
because the defendant would necessarily have to prove the plaintiffs
case. 4 "Rather, where the complaint fails to state a specific amount of
damages, the defendant must allege facts sufficient to establish that the
plaintiff would more likely than not recover more than the jurisdictional
amount. 42
It was not until six years later in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service
Corp.43 however, that the Eleventh Circuit first applied the preponderEleventh Circuit also noted that unlike Bums' proposed test, its legal certainty test does not
expand federal jurisdiction or broaden the removal statute because anytime a plaintiff sued for less
than the jurisdictional amount, the mere possibility that she would be awarded more than she pled
was not enough to warrant removal. Id.
35. Powell & Pearce-Reggio, supra note 7, at 236.
36. 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir.
2008); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007).
37. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. 752 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
40. Id. at 756.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 77 F.3d 1353 (11 th Cir. 1996).
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ance of the evidence standard to a plea of unspecified damages. The

Eleventh Circuit held that "[w]here a plaintiff has made an unspecified
demand for damages, a lower burden of proof is warranted because there
is simply no estimate of damages to which a court may defer."' Citing
Gafford v. General Electric Co.,45 decided by the Sixth Circuit only
three years after Garza, the court held that the defendant need only

prove that the amount in controversy "more likely that not" exceeds the
jurisdictional amount.46

3.

EVIDENCE ASSESSED IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT UNDER THE
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD

Exactly what type of evidence the Eleventh Circuit evaluates in
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard is disputed. On the
one hand, decisions before Lowery seem to take a more liberal approach
in considering certain evidence. For instance, in Williams v. Best Buy
Co. Inc.,47 the Eleventh Circuit held that a court may consider whether it
is "facially apparent" from the facts in the complaint or removal petition4 8 that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy.49 Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit in Miedema v. Maytag Corp. and Allen v. Toyota Motor
Sales U.S.A., Inc., read into the factual allegations in the removal document and the complaint, respectively, in assessing whether the defendant
met its burden in proving the jurisdictional amount. 50 In Miedema the
Eleventh Circuit held that the declaration relied upon in the notice of
removal did not establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance
44. Id. at 1357. In Gafford v. General Electric Co. the Sixth Circuit also justified this lower
burden:
The "legal certainty" test in removal cases arose in a context where the plaintiffs
prayer for damages in state court exceeded the federal amount-in-controversy
requirement. In such a case as that, it is proper to presume that the plaintiffs prayer
is an appropriate presentation of potential damages because the damages sought are
against the plaintiffs interests. There can be no such presumption where there is no
specific prayer for damages. Thus, the "legal certainty" test should not be applied to
situations ... where damages are unspecified.
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 160 (6th Cir. 1993): see also Singer v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997); Garza, 752 F. Supp. at 755-56.
45. 997 F.2d 150, 159 (6th Cir. 1993) ("It does not place upon the defendant the daunting
burden of proving, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff's damages are not less than the amount-incontroversy requirement. Such a burden might well require the defendant to research, state and
prove the plaintiff's claim for damages.").
46. Id. at 159.
47. 269 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2001).
48. See Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967 (1Ith Cir. 2002) (concluding that where
conclusory jurisdictional allegations set forth in the removal petition are insufficient, remand is
appropriate).
49. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
50. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322 (11 th Cir. 2006); Allen v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A. Inc., 155 F. App'x 480 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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of the evidence because the declaration offered no explanation as to how
the jurisdictional amount was calculated. 5 ' In the same way that the
Miedema court relied on the removal petition, in Toyota the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the amount of damages specified in the plaintiff's complaint in holding that Toyota proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy might exceed the jurisdictional amount.52
If, however, the jurisdictional amount is not apparent from the face
of the complaint or removal petition, the Eleventh Circuit in Williams
also concluded that the district court may "require evidence relevant to
the amount in controversy at the time the case was removed. '53 This
evidence should also include post-removal evidence because removal
cannot merely be based on conclusory allegations. 54 The Eleventh Circuit first advocated this flexible approach in Sierminski v. Transouth
FinancialCorp.5 when it failed to find a good reason to keep a district
court from reviewing evidence outside the removal petition. 6 Citing
Allen and Harmon, the court held that the only limitation was that any
jurisdictional evidence in support of removal must be judged at the time
of removal and, as a result, must shed light on the situation that existed
when the case was removed.5 7
With Eleventh Circuit preponderance of the evidence precedent
well underway, the district courts began applying the preponderance
standard in a very similar stance. For example, courts began to hold that
while allegations set forth in the complaint can help establish the amount
in controversy, 58 if the defendant does not provide facts in his removal
51. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1331.
52. Toyota, 155 F. App'x at 482.
53. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1331 (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001)); see Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805 (11th Cir.
2003) (concluding that where the defendant, Federated, failed to provide evidence to show that
plaintiffs bad faith claim satisfied the amount in controversy, Federated did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that removal was proper).
54. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319; see also McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind.
Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (stating that the court may demand evidence necessary to support
jurisdiction); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the district court may "require parties to submit summary judgment type evidence relevant to the
amount in controversy at the time of removal" (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)) (in turn quoting Allen v. R&H Oil and Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326,
1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995))).
55. Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 945.
56. Id. at 949; see also Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335 ("[U]nder any manner of proof, the
jurisdictional facts that support removal must be judged at the time of removal, any post-petition
affidavits are allowable only if relevant to that period of time.").
57. Harmon v. OKI Sys.,l15 F.3d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1997); Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335.
58. Branson v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 5:06cv332, 2007 WL 170094, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18,
2007) (finding that the defendants established the jurisdictional amount because the "[c]ourt [was]
hard-pressed to conclude that if liability was established in this case there is any possibility that
the damages would be less than $75,000").

1482

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1473

petition showing that the plaintiff's claim "more likely than not" exceeds
the jurisdictional limit, the defendant has not met his burden.5 9 Subse-

quent to Williams, district courts also found that if the amount in controversy is not apparent from the complaint or the removal petition, the
defendant may introduce supporting evidence relevant to the time of
removal. 60 This evidence not only includes estimates of damages alleged
in the plaintiff's complaint, 6' but also the submission of declarations,
settlement offers, and affidavits that establish the amount in
controversy.62
III.

LOWERY V. ALABAMA POWER Co.

It was not until the Eleventh Circuit's 2007 decision in Lowery that
the court significantly narrowed the amount of evidence a district court
can consider under the preponderance of the evidence standard.63 In this
59. Stanridge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Moore v.
CNA Found., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (holding that defendants did not meet
the amount in controversy burden because they did not discuss specific facts that indicate the
value of the plaintiffs claim); Wheeler v. Allstate Floridian Indem. Co., No. 3:05cv208, 2006 WL
1133249, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2006) (holding in a CAFA case that where a removal petition's
bare assertions are based on the complaint's cursory estimation of the amount of potential class
members claims, without further evidentiary support, the defendant failed to prove the
jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence); Tidwell v. Coldwater Covers, Inc., 393
F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (stating that conclusory allegations that the jurisdictional
amount is satisfied is insufficient); Big Stakes Match Play, LLC, v. Golf Stakes, LLC, No. 1:02cv-1876, 2002 WL 34186932, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2002) (concluding that a bald assertion on
the value of injunctive relief is insufficient).
60. Young v. Cargill Juice N.A., Inc., No. 8:06cv 1350, 2006 WL 3544810, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 13, 2008); Morock v. Chautauqua Airlines, Inc., No. 8:07cv00210, 2007 WL 1725232, at
*2-3 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2007); Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d
1323, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Deel v. Metromedia Rest. Serv., Inc., No. 3:05cv120, 2006 WL
481667, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2006).
61. Anderson v. Lotus Cars USA, Inc., No. 8:06cv1944, 2007 WL 1229105, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 26, 2007) (stating that the defendant did not meet his burden because he failed to provide an
estimate on damages); Pensinger v. State Farm and Cas. Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (M.D.
Ala. 2003) (holding that defendants did not meet their burden because they did not present
evidence that established the cost of damage to plaintiff's home).
62. Young, 2006 WL 3544810, at *3 (holding that where plaintiff admitted in her response to
discovery requests that she was claiming damages in excess of $75,000, the defendant established
the amount in controversy); Morock, 2007 WML
1725232, at *3 (holding that the defendant met the
preponderance of the evidence burden by plaintiff's refusal to comply with discovery in regards to
the settlement offer); Main Drug, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (finding that defendants met the amount
in controversy through the submission of plaintiff affidavits and declarations); Deel, 2006 WL
481667, at *2 (finding that under the preponderance of the evidence standard, a settlement letter is
sufficient to determine removal jurisdiction). But see Lowe's OK'D Used Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance
Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (concluding that although standing alone
defendant had met its preponderance burden by offering damage award examples and by the fact
that plaintiff refused to state in her answers to interrogatories that the amount in controversy was
below $75,000, plaintiffs offered enough evidence to rebut this presumption).
63. J. Brannon Maner, Removal Under Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 70 ALA. LAW. 120,
120 (2009).

2010]

TO REMOVE OR NOT TO REMOVE

1483

CAFA case decided shortly after the Act's passage, the plaintiffs sued
twelve corporations and 120 fictitious entities for emitting gas into the
atmosphere and ground water. 64 In the third and final amended complaint, filed a year later, the plaintiffs added Alabama Power Company
and Filler Products Company as defendants.6 5 A month later, Alabama
Power filed a notice of removal under CAFA's mass action provision
asserting that the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint consisted of claims of over 100 persons, the
claims totaled more than $5,000,000, each claim was for an amount in
excess of $75,000, and all the claims involved common questions of law
or fact.66 Alabama Power attached to its removal petition a copy of the
original complaint and the third amended complaint.6 7 In a footnote, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that although Alabama Power had engaged in
considerable discovery with the plaintiffs before the removal petition
was filed, discovery that included the location of the plaintiffs' properties, Alabama Power cited nothing from such discovery in support of its
removal petition.6 8
The plaintiffs responded to Alabama Power's removal petition by
claiming that Alabama Power had not met its burden of establishing
jurisdiction because neither the complaint nor the removal petition specifically stated the amount of damages the plaintiffs were claiming.69
Alabama Power quickly responded by filing a supplement to its removal
petition which stated that the amount in controversy had been met
because the case involved over 100 persons, each plaintiff only had to
recover $12,500 for the claims to total an excess of $5,000,000, and
similar Alabama tort class-action verdicts or settlements totaled over
$5,000,000.70
At the jurisdiction hearing two days later, plaintiffs' counsel conceded jurisdiction. 7 ' However, after the hearing on August 16, the district court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to file, pursuant to FRCP Rule 11,
the names of the plaintiffs whose claims reasonably exceeded $75,000.72
64.
65.
66.
67.

Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1189.

68. Id. at n.8.
69. Id. at 1189.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1190.
72. Id. But see Thomas M. Byrne & Valerie S. Sanders, 'See No Removal, Hear No
Removal': The Eleventh Circuit'sNew Posture on Removal in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 25
No. 15 ANDREWS Toxic TORTS Lrr. REP. 11 (2007) (noting that although Lowery required the
removing documents to unequivocally establish jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP Rule 11, that rule
requires only that the allegations "have evidentiary support or if specifically so identified, are
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The plaintiffs replied to the order by stating that they lacked sufficient
information to deny that each claim exceeded the $75,000 threshold. 3 A
week later, Alabama Power filed a response to the plaintiffs' reply stating that CAFA's $75,000 threshold is an exception, rather than a
requirement, to the court's jurisdiction. 4 Specifically, Alabama Power
argued that under CAFA, defendants could establish jurisdiction as long
as the plaintiff class exceeds 100 claims and as long as the total amount
in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.75
In a memorandum opinion, the district court held that first, it lacked
jurisdiction over those defendants who had been made parties prior to
CAFA's enactment. 76 Second, the court held that even if every single
defendant was properly before the court, the defendants had failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that each individual plaintiff's
claim was in excess of $75,000 or that the total sum of all the claims was
in excess of $5,000,000.17 Following the district court's remand order,
Alabama Power and a majority of the pre-CAFA defendants moved the
Eleventh Circuit for leave to appeal.
Although the defendants' appeals involved four distinct issues,
including an explanation of CAFA's mass action provision and removal
guidelines, the removal burden discussion is the one of most concern
here. After a brief critique of the McNutt preponderance of the evidence
standard, the Court noted that assuming past Eleventh Circuit decisions
were correct in relying on McNutt, the preponderance of the evidence
standard has always been used to weigh pieces of evidence in a situation
and, as such, cannot be applied to naked pleadings. 78 The Eleventh Circuit stated that although it did not have the evidence to determine the
amount in controversy and only had naked pleadings, it was bound to
follow Eleventh Circuit precedent and erroneously apply the preponderance of the evidence standard to the naked-pleading context. 79 As such,
it was at a loss at how to apply the preponderance standard because
Alabama Power had not produced any evidence beyond the pleadings
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
73. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1191 (11 th Cir. 2007).
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1192.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1210.
79. Id. (The Eleventh Circuit cited Tapscott, Gafford, and Garza in holding that courts
typically always have evidence beyond the pleadings when they apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard in the removal context to determine the amount in controversy); see Friedman
v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2005); Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage
Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (lIth Cir. 2001).
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for the court to weigh in determining the amount in controversy.80
Instead, all the Court had before it was the jurisdictional representations
in the removal petition and the allegations of the third amended
8
complaint. '
Significantly, the court held that per the removal scheme set forth
in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) and 1447(c),82 courts must assess the amount in
controversy by relying only on the removal documents:
If the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face of the
documents before the court, or readily deducible from them, then the
court has jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand. Under this
approach, jurisdiction is either evident from the removing documents
or remand is appropriate.8 3
By applying a method of analysis similar to the removal scheme found
in Section 1446(b), the court stated that when assessing the propriety of
removal, the court could only consider the notice of removal and any
accompanying documents.8 4 This fact falls in line with the requirements
set forth by Section 1446(b), which allows the court to consider only
documents received by the defendant from the plaintiff. If, the court
stated, the evidence allowed is insufficient to establish the amount in
controversy, the court must remand because neither "the defendants nor
the court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the notice's filings."'85 The court also noted in a footnote that if the defendant could
meet this heightened evidentiary burden, it could surely meet a more
stringent evidentiary standard similar to the legal certainty burden.86
The Eleventh Circuit eventually remanded the case and concluded
that Alabama Power had failed to meet its burden and assert a factual
basis that fulfilled CAFA's jurisdictional requirements.8 7 Specifically,
80. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007).
8 I.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit also held that under the preponderance of the evidence standard,
the removing defendant must establish the amount in controversy by the "greater weight of the
evidence .... [a] superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly
from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the
issue rather than the other." Id. at 1209 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 1220 (8th ed. 2004)).
82. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b)-(c) (2007) (referring to the notice of removal as a prerequisite to
establishing jurisdiction).
83. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1211.
84. Id. at 1214. The court also made clear that defendant's knowledge of the amount in
controversy will usually come from an "other paper" under Section 1446(b) because in the usual
circumstance, a plaintiff who has chosen to file in state court will purposely fail to assign a
specific damage amount to the complaint. In these situations, if the defendant fails to produce this
"other paper," the amount of damages will be too speculative and remand will ordinarily be
appropriate. See id. at 1215 n.63.
85. Id. at 1214; The court noted that if it allowed mere speculation as a basis for removal, the
"reasonable inquiry" standard under FRCP Rule 11 would serve no purpose. See id. at 1215 n.67.
86. Id.

87. Id. at 1218.
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the court stated that the defendants were unable to establish that the
amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Pursuant to Section
1446(b), after looking to the face of the notice of removal and any
attached documents, including the third amended complaint, the court
held that neither document provided any concrete information on the
amount of the plaintiffs' claims.8 8 Further, the court rebutted Alabama
Power's argument in concluding that the value of the plaintiffs' claims
could not be speculated from the pleadings themselves without any evidence on the subject.8 9 Before concluding, the court also held that evidence of damage awards in similar tort cases could not be introduced to
support the amount in controversy because extrinsic evidence fails to say
anything about the value of a plaintiffs' claim. 90

IV.

ANALYSIS: THE RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL PREPONDERANCE

OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD

Critics say Lowery's holding is designed to make "removal more
difficult [for defendants] when the plaintiff opposes it."' The Lowery
court made clear its intention when it said that any "[d]ocuments
received by the defendant must contain an unambiguous statement that
clearly establishes federal jurisdiction."9' 2 Particularly, the court explicitly stated that the defendant should be able to satisfy a higher burden
similar to the legal certainty burden to remove. 93 Although district court
decisions after Lowery place a very high removal burden similar to the
legal certainty burden on the defendant, recent district court decisions
have shifted away from the Lowery holding and shifted back to the original, more liberal preponderance of the evidence standard, increasing
defendants' chances of removal. At its core, this shift makes apparent
the uncertainty federal circuits face in applying the preponderance of the
"disagree as to the
evidence standard especially when most courts
'94
requirements of their own particular standard.
88. Id. at 1220.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1221; see also Ponce v. Fontainebleau Resorts, LLC., No. 0921548, 2009 WL
2948543, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2009) (citing Lowery in holding that the court was skeptical to
assess the value of the plaintiff's claim by looking to damage awards in similar cases).
91. Thomas M. Byrne, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2008); see
also Brannon Maner, supra note 63, at 126; Byrne & Sanders, supra note 72; Dixon & Walz,

supra note 2, at 1.
92. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1213 n.63 (1 th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hanna Steel Corp., et al., v. Lowery, et al., 76 USLW 3633
app. at 66a, 79a (U.S. Apr. 1.2008) (No. 07-1246) (stating that the Lowery Court held that a
defendant cannot remove a case to federal court unless it has "received from the plaintiff 'clear'
and 'unequivocal' evidence establishing the amount in controversy").
93. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1211 n.59.
94. Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy
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Legal Certainty Decisions in the Eleventh Circuit

The main thrust of almost all the legal certainty decisions in the
Eleventh Circuit is the fact that the defendant has a right to remain in
federal court as long as the case is "clearly worth more than the jurisdictional amount."95 In other words, the defendant has the burden of proving that to a legal certainty, the value of the plaintiffs claim is not less
than the jurisdictional threshold.9 6 In meeting this standard, that the
plaintiff "could" recover more is not sufficient to establish the jurisdictional amount-the plaintiffs claim "must" exceed the amount in controversy.9 7 Though it is heavier than the "more likely than not"
balancing scheme of the preponderance of the evidence standard, the
legal certainty burden is not impossible to meet. 98
B.

Post-Lowery Decisions Similar to the Legal Certainty Burden

In Lowery, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the court would not
speculate on the value of the plaintiffs' claims by reading into the pleadings without the benefit of any evidence. 99 Similarly, district court decisions decided soon after Lowery began to hold that under the
preponderance of the evidence standard, clear evidence as to the value
of a claim must be presented in order for the court to read into the pleadings allegations. 100 Courts justified this contention by citing Lowery and
Cannot be Determined from the Face of the Complaint: The Need for Judicial and Statutory
Reform to Preserve the Defendant's Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 Mo. L. REV. 681, 692
(1997).
95. Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also
Hogans v. Reynolds, No. 2:05cv350, 2005 WL 1514070, at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2005); Cowan
v. Outpatient Partners, Inc., No. 6:04cv28, 2004 WL 1084160, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2004)
(holding that the defendant had not proved the amount in controversy to a legal certainty because
there was more than a chance that a state court would award the plaintiff less than the
jurisdictional amount); Pease v. Medtronic, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Jackson v.
Am. Bankers, 976 F. Supp. 1450, 1451 (S.D. Ala. 1997); Progressive Specialty v. Nobles, 928 F.
Supp. 1096, 1098 (S.D. Ala. 1997).
96. Jackson, 976 F. Supp. at 1454.
97. Bums, 31 F.3d at 1096; Hogans, 2005 WL 1514070, at *3 n.7; Quitman Church's
Chicken, Inc. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
98. Hogans, 2005 WL 1514070, at *2 (citing Bums, 31 F.3d at 1096); see Bums, 31 F.3d at
1096 (holding that although settlement offers alone are not enough to prove the amount in
controversy, they do count for something); James v. CSX Transp. Inc., No. cv507-17, 2007 WL
1100503, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007) (concluding that clear evidence, through expert witnesses
and similar cases, of compensatory damages coupled with punitive damages is sufficient to meet
the legal certainty burden); Pease, 6. F. Supp. 2d at 1357 (same); Progressive Specialty, 928 F.
Supp at 1098 (holding that settlement offers count for something when attempting to prove the
amount in controversy).
99. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1220 (11th Cir. 2007).
100. McCollough Enter., LLC, v. Marvin Windows & Doors, No. cvO9-0310, 2009 WL
2216599, at *2 (S.D. Ala. July 20, 2009); MacDonald v. Circle K Stores, Inc., No. 6:08cv1825,
2009 WL 113377, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16. 2009) (holding that the defendant did not establish the
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noting that after Lowery, speculations on the value of the plaintiff's

claim were not allowed in the Eleventh Circuit. 0°' For instance, in
McCall v. Dickson and Spivey v. Fred's Inc., the District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama found that outlining the types of damages
the plaintiff had suffered was not enough to meet the jurisdictional

amount in controversy. 102 The District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama also noted the complexity of damage speculations in Johnson
v. Ansell Protective Products when it found that nothing about the plaintiff's allegations that he sustained severe bums and permanent scarring
and was claiming medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional dis-

tress, and mental anguish made it easy to deduce the amount in controversy. 0 3 The court there held that "[following Lowery 'it [was]
insufficient to rely on the severity of the injuries alleged' to establish
that it is readily deducible or 'facially apparent that the damages exceed
the jurisdictional minimum.""'o Moreover, in Howell v. Fields Realty
and Wood v. Option One Mortgage Corp., district courts like the Middle
and Northern District of Alabama, respectively, were quick to concede

that although the amount in controversy might exist per the plaintiff's
allegations, deciding so without the basis of any evidence would be mere
jurisdictional amount where the defendant failed to provide supporting documentation and
evidence, other than the already submitted requests for admission, relevant to the amount in
controversy); Eyler v. ILD Telecomm., Inc., No. 3:08cv351, 2008 WL 5110754, at *9 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 25, 2008) (stating that an affidavit confirming that defendant had customers numbering in
the hundreds of thousands was not enough to establish jurisdiction for a CAFA claim because the
affiant could have been more specific).
101. McCall v. Dickson, No. 3:08cv985, 2009 WL 424727, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2009)
(holding that outlining the type of damages in the complaint is not sufficient to establish
jurisdiction); McAndrew v. Nolen, et al., No. 3:08cv294, 2009 WL 259735, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb.
4, 2009) (holding that the allegations in the complaint for permanent injuries, pain and suffering,
lost wages, loss of earning capacity, and loss of quality of life did not demonstrate that the
plaintiff was so seriously injured that she sustained damages in excess of the jurisdictional
amount); Spivey v. Fred's Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (holding that
determining the amount in controversy from damages for mental anguish and punitive damages,
costs, fees, and medical expenses, was mere speculation); Wood v. Option One Mortgage Corp.,
580 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1252-53 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (recognizing that "while the amount in
controversy might exist" if the court finds jurisdiction on the allegations and damages in the
complaint and removal documents, it would be mere speculation); Johnson v. Ansell Protective
Prods., No. 08-0394, 2008 WL 4493588, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2008) (holding that nothing
about the plaintiffs allegations that he sustained severe burns, permanent scarring, and is claiming
medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and mental anguish make it easy to
deduce the amount in controversy); Howell v. Fields Realty, LLC, No. 2:08cv492, 2008 WL
2705383, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 10, 2008) (finding that although the plaintiff alleged permanent
injuries and punitive damages of a nature that a claim exceeding $75,000 is reasonable, the
defendant presented no evidence that the amount in controversy had been met).
102. McCall, 2009 WL 424727, at *2; Spivey, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
103. Johnson, 2008 WL 4493588, at *8.
104. Id. (citing Williamson v. Home Depot USA Inc., No. 07-61643, 2008 WL 2262044, at *2
(S.D. Fla. May 30, 2008)).
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5

Arguably, the clear-evidence standard advocated in Lowery and
post-Lowery district court preponderance of the evidence decisions
strikes a very close resemblance to the legal certainty burden. Much like
Lowery's heightened preponderance of the evidence standard, the legal
certainty burden holds that unless it is clear that the amount in contro-

versy is worth more than the jurisdictional amount, removal is not
proper. 106 Further, under both, plaintiff admission of the amount in controversy is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
To begin with, in Burns the Eleventh Circuit first held that under
the legal certainty standard, settlement offers by themselves are not sufficient proof of jurisdiction.' 0 7 District courts such as the Southern District of Alabama and the Southern District of Georgia also took a similar
position toward settlement offers when they found them insufficient to
meet the legal certainty standard in Jackson v. American Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida and General Pump & Well Inc. v. Matrix Drilling
Products Co."°8 After Lowery, however, contrary to pre-Lowery precedent, district courts began to hold that under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, plaintiff stipulations about the amount in controversy,
particularly in the form of settlement offers, were insufficient to support
jurisdiction." ° The Southern District of Alabama reiterated the ineffec105. Wood, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53; Howell, 2008 WL 2705383, at *2.
106. Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
107. Id. at 1097.
108. Gen. Pump & Well Inc. v. Matrix Drilling Prods. Co., No. cv608045, 2009 WL 812340,
at *3 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2009) (citing Burns in holding that a settlement offer is not sufficient
to prove the amount in controversy); Jackson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 976 F. Supp. 1450,
1454 (S.D. Ala. 1997) (noting that the jurisdictional amount of a case is not the settlement value);
see also Daniel v. Nationpoint, No. 2:07cv640, 2007 WL 4533121, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 19,
2007) (holding that the fact that the defendants offered to settle the case for more than the
jurisdictional amount does not establish to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy had
been met); Progressive v. Nobles, 928 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (relying on the fact
that the only evidence was a settlement offer, the court held that the defendant failed to prove to a
legal certainty that the jurisdictional amount had been met).
109. See Eyler v. ILD Telecomm., Inc., No. 3:08cv351, 2008 WL 5110754, at *9 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 25, 2008). But see, Young v. Cargill Juice N.A., Inc., No. 8:06cv1350, 2006 WL 3544810, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2008) (holding that where plaintiff admitted in her response to discovery
requests that she was claiming damages in excess of $75,000, the defendant established the
amount in controversy under the preponderance of the evidence standard); Morock v. Chautauqua
Airlines, Inc., No. 8:07cv00210, 2007 WL 1725232, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2007) (holding that
the defendant met the preponderance of the evidence burden by plaintiffs refusal to comply with
discovery in regards to the settlement offer); Deel v. Metromedia Rest. Serv., Inc., No. 3:05cv 120,
2006 WL 481667, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2006) (finding that under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, a settlement letter is sufficient to determine removal jurisdiction); Lowe's
OK'D Used Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(concluding that defendant had met its preponderance burden by offering damage award examples
and by the fact that plaintiff had refused to state in her answers to interrogatories that the amount
in controversy was below $75,000).
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tiveness of settlement offers in Jackson v. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc., when it noted that under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the judiciary should approach settlement demands with skepticism. 110 Skeptic the courts were: the District Courts for the Southern
District and Middle District of Florida ultimately determined that a settlement offer was insufficient evidence"'I because it is merely a stipula-

tion by the plaintiff that it believes its case is worth a certain amount." 12
The key similarity, however, is the fact that under both the legal
certainty burden and the Lowery preponderance of the evidence stan-3
dard, the amount in controversy must be an objective determination."
In other words, speculations and guesstimates derived from reading into
the plaintiffs allegations are prohibited."' In reaching this determination, both standards rely heavily on the implications of FRCP Rule
11.' 5 In adopting the legal certainty burden in Burns the Eleventh Circuit held that a difficult burden was necessary because "plaintiffs claim,

when it is specific and in a pleading signed by a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth.""' 6 In support of this contention, the
Court cited Rule 11 of Alabama's Rules of Civil Procedure that, almost
identically to FRCP Rule 11, ensures the certification and support base
of counsel's arguments." 7 Similarly, in Lowery, the Eleventh Circuit
again held that to allow speculation as a basis for removal would be to
I10. Jackson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 08-0628, 2009 WL 2385084, at *I (S.D.
Ala. July 31, 2009).
111. Desmond v. HSBC Card Servs., Inc., No. 8:09cv1272, 2009 WL 2436582, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 6, 2009); Love v. N. Tool & Equip. Co., No. 08-20453, 2008 WL 2955124, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 1, 2008); see also Dutton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 6:09cv1057, 2009 WL
2985685, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2009) (determining that plaintiffs settlement offer, along with
other evidence, fell short of proving that defendants fulfilled the preponderance of the evidence
burden and establishing the amount in controversy); Fields v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No.
6:08cv632, 2008 WL 2705424, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2008) (finding that although the
defendant could have made an argument supporting the amount in controversy by plaintiffs
demand letter, he failed to do so).
112. Love, 2008 WL 2955124, at *2; see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1215
(I Ith Cir. 2007) (noting that "the defendant nor the court can speculate to make up for the notice's
failings").
113. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The standard is an
objective one; plaintiff's or plaintiffs counsel's subjective intent in drafting the prayer is not the
true issue."); Ponce v. Fontainebleau Resorts, LLC., No. 0921548, 2009 WL 2948543, at *6 (S.D.
Fla. July 13, 2009) (citing Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096); Pease v. Medtronic, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1356
(S.D. Fla. 1998); Jackson, 976 F. Supp. at 1451.
114. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214-15, 1220.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214 n.67; Bums, 31 F.2d at 1095 n.5.
116. Bums, 31 F.3d at 1095; see also Ponce, 2009 WL 2948543, at *6; James v. CSX Transp.
Inc., No. cv50717, 2007 WL 1100503, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007); Hogans v. Reynolds, No.
2:05cv350, 2005 WL 1514070, at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2005); Cowan v. Outpatient Partners,
Inc., No. 6:04cv28orl22jgg, 2004 WL 1084160, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2004); Quitman
Church's Chicken, Inc. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
117. ALA.R. Civ. P. 11.
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"erode the 'reasonable inquiry' standard of Rule 11 generally."' 8
Although both the legal certainty burden and the Lowery preponderance standard justify their holdings on the veracity and importance of
the plaintiff's claims, it appears that the legal certainty burden has more
reason to do so. Under that burden, the plaintiff has already alleged a
specific amount of damages below the jurisdictional threshold. That the
plaintiffs allegations should be given deference in this situation is obvious. 1 9 According to the Burns Court, a defendant's right to remove and
a plaintiff's right to choose his forum are not on equal footing. 20 This is
so because the plaintiff is the master of his complaint and, if the plaintiff
chooses to plead less than the jurisdictional amount, the sum demanded
should be the amount in controversy.'
C.

Recent District Court Decisions Apply the Original
Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard

Recently, however, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have
begun to stray away from Lowery's strict holding by applying the more
liberal and circuit-recognized, pre-Lowery preponderance of the evidence standard. But despite this fact, courts are still justifying these
decisions under Lowery. For example, similar to the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Williams, district courts began to determine the amount in
controversy by making a common sense evaluation of the facts alleged
in the removal document or the complaint. 22 Although it seems that this
118. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1214 n.67 (11 th Cir. 2007).
119. But see Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 808 (11 th Cir.
2003) (citing Burns in noting that pursuant to FRCP Rule 11, the court should give great deference
to any representations by plaintiff, whether or not a specific amount of damages is stated in the
complaint).
120. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
121. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 27.
122. Devore v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. 3:09cv690, 2009 WL 3110814, at *7 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 28, 2009) (stating that defendant satisfied the jurisdictional amount by asserting that the
claim was a products liability action in which the plaintiff claimed to have suffered significant
injuries severe enough to value over $100,000 in medical bills); Windfall Props. v. AnnTaylor
Retail, Inc., No. 6:09cv1033, 2009 WL 2928892, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 9, 2009) (stating that the
plaintiff met the jurisdictional amount by presenting allegations that it had not re-let the premises
it sought back-rent for as of the date of the complaint); Roe v. Michelin N.A., No. 2:08cv837,
2009 WL 2232207, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 28, 2009) (holding that the defendant satisfied the
jurisdictional amount by asserting that the wanton conduct of a large company resulting in
plaintiffs wrongful death was enough to meet the amount in controversy); Harrison v. Ace Am.
Ins. Co., No. 2:09cv229, 2009 WL 1664372, at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2009) ("Jurisdiction is
unambiguously established by the face of the complaint because it alleges that Harrison made a
demand for policy limits, which exceed [the jurisdictional amount], and on a policy issued by the
defendant."); Henderson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 07-0799, 2009 WL 959560, at *4 (S.D. Ala.
Apr. 7, 2009) (holding that "a fair and impartial mind" would find that the damages claimed and
the years of pain add up to over the jurisdictional amount); Angrinon v. KLI, Inc., No. 08-81218,
2009 WL 506954m at *4 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2009) ("Based on the unchallenged factual allegation
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evaluation runs contrary to Lowery's refusal to rely on speculations and
conclusory allegations without any clear evidence, courts have justified
their holdings by stating that
Lowery does not impose hyper-technical rules on litigants seeking to
remove cases that clearly belong in federal court. The removal rules
as interpreted by Lowery protect against "speculation" as to whether
jurisdiction exists. It is the absence of factual allegations that should
prevent courts from determining the existence of jurisdiction "by
'
looking to the stars."123
In Roe v. Michelin North America and Devore v. Howmedica Osteonics
Corp., the Middle Districts of both Florida and Alabama were quick to
make clear that Lowery in no way prevents a district court from using
common sense to determine the jurisdictional amount, especially when a
plaintiff refuses to concede that it is seeking a specific amount of
24
damages. 1
Most importantly, recent district court decisions support the preLowery, Williams, and Sierminksi rule by allowing the introduction of
supporting evidence relevant to the time of removal, including settlement offers. 125 Although the Lowery court did state that settlement
that a life was lost, the Court has engaged in a common sense evaluation of the types of damages
that plaintiff is seeking and concludes defendant has established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000."); Pittinos v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., No. 08-0662, 2009 WL 424317, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2009) (recognizing
that if the plaintiff proves that the defendant breached the contract it is reasonable to expect that
damages will be in excess of the jurisdictional amount because the plaintiff will live and be
entitled to benefits up until the date of trial); Macy's Fla. Stores, LLC v. I11.Nat. Ins. Co., No. 0821619, 2008 WL 2741132, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2008) (holding that the defendant satisfied the
jurisdictional amount because the evidence introduced confirmed that the minimum amount in
controversy was $85,000 to $70,000 already expended defending the lawsuit and $15,000
expended in meeting the jurisdictional requirements); Sanderson v. Daimler Chrysler Motor
Corp., No. 07-0559, 2009 WL 2988222, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2007) (holding that the defendant
met the jurisdictional amount by asserting that the complaint's allegations, which stated the
plaintiff had experienced serious permanent disfigurement and scarring to her face and body, were
enough to meet the jurisdictional threshold); Barnes v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. 07-60441,
2007 WL 1362504, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2007) (recognizing that the defendant met the amount
in controversy by offering the allegations of plaintiffs complaint and its own records as evidence
that the compensatory damages, front pay, attorneys fees, and emotional distress would exceed
$75,000).
123. Harrison, 2009 WL 1664372, at *2.
124. Devore, 2009 WL 3110814, at *7; Roe, 2009 WL 2232207, at *2.
125. McCollough v. Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P., No. 3:09cv1038, 2010 WL 55862, at *5
(M.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2010); Boland v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 2009 WL 4730681, at *3 (M.D.
Ala. Dec 7, 2009); Ralph v. Target Corp., No. 6:09-cv- 1328-Orl- 19KRS, 2009 WL 3200680, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009); Devore, 2009 WL 3110814, at *7; Rollo v. Kleim, No. 3:09cv146,
2009 WL 1684612, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 16, 2009); Frazier ex. rel. Corado v. Shelton & Tyrone
Powe Logging, No. 09-0119, 2009 WL 1598428, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 3, 2009); Katz v. J.C.
Penney Corp., No. 09cv60067, 2009 WL 1532129, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2009); Hardesty v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 6:09cv735, 2009 WL 1423957, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 18,
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offers and demand letters could be considered an "other paper" under

Section 1446(b)'s removal scheme, 126 under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, district courts soon after Lowery were wary to rely on
settlement offers in establishing jurisdiction. Since its inception, the
Burns decision has been consistently cited in holding that settlement
offers should not alone determine jurisdiction, 12 7 mostly because they
"reflect puffing and posturing" and should therefore be entitled to little
weight.1 28 This fact coupled with Lowery's strict holding made it fairly
impossible to establish jurisdiction by way of a settlement offer, unless
it provided specific information about the plaintiffs damages to support
the contention that jurisdiction was present. 129 In practice, the Southern
District of Alabama in Jackson v. Select Porfolio Servicing, Inc. even
went as far to note that because the defendant failed to offer a nonspeculative way of determining the settlement offer's value, it was not
relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. 130
Yet district courts are more consistently finding demand and
settlement letters sufficient to establish jurisdiction.13 ' In doing
so, some courts are also relying on common sense and the factual
allegations of the plaintiff's case. 132 For instance, in Ralph v. Target
2009); Bankhead v. Am. Suzuki Motors Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2008);
Lazo v. US Airways, Inc., No. 08-80391, 2008 WL 3926430, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug 26, 2008).
126. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1212 n.62 (11th Cir. 2007).
127. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 1994).
128. Jackson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2009); see
also Dutton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 6:09cv1057, 2009 WL 2985685, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 15, 2009); Desmond v. HSBC Card Servs., Inc., No. 8:09cv 1272, 2009 WL 2436582, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2009); Love v. N. Tool & Equip. Co., No. 08-20453, 2008 WL 2955124, at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2008).
129. Golden Apple Mgmt. Co. v. Geac Computers, Inc., 990 F.Supp. 1364, 1368 (M.D. Ala.
1998); see also Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214 (noting that if the accompanying documents to the
notice of removal do not clearly establish that jurisdiction was present, a court cannot speculate as
to whether the amount in controversy has been met).
130. Jackson, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 n.5 (emphasis added).
131. Ralph v. Target Corp., No. 6:09-cv-1328-OrI-19KRS, 2009 WL 3200680, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 30, 2009); Rollo v. Kleim, No. 3:09cv146, 2009 WL 1684612, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 16,
2009). Alongside settlement offers, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit are also finding
affidavits sufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction. See Katz v. J.C. Penney Corp., No.
09cv60067, 2009 WL 1532129, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2009) (stating that an affidavit by
defendant's counsel confirming that damages would exceed the jurisdictional minimum could be
considered in determining the jurisdictional amount); Lazo v. US Airways, Inc., No. 08-80391,
2008 WL 3926430, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug 26, 2008) (holding that the defendant had provided
sufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction by providing an affidavit attesting to a conversation he
had with plaintiff's counsel regarding the amount in controversy).
132. See Katz, 2009 WL 1532129, at *4 (concluding that plaintiff's pre-suit demand package
claiming damages that exceed the jurisdictional amount may be considered in evaluating whether
a case has been properly removed); Hardesty v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 6:09cv735,
2009 WL 1423957, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2009) (holding that where plaintiff's counsel sends
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Corp.,3 3 the Middle District of Florida held that the settlement letter

was enough to establish jurisdiction because the plaintiff had specifically described her injuries and held that her damages were in excess of
the jurisdictional amount.' 34 Similarly, in Rollo v. Kleim, the District
Court for the Northern District of Florida recognized that the special
damages in the demand letter, together with the likelihood of general
damages, and the loss of consortium claim show 35that the defendant met
its burden in proving the jurisdictional amount.'
On different justifications, district courts are also finding settlement
and demand letters sufficient as long as the plaintiff's demand is in line
with Lowery's "unambiguous evidence" requirement 36 or jurisdiction is
evident from the settlement. 37 For example, in Frazierex. rel. Corado
v. Shelton & Tyrone Powe Logging the Southern District of Alabama

determined that the demand letter was enough to establish the amount in
controversy where the plaintiff explicitly stated that the case was worth
more than the jurisdictional amount. 138 In Bankhead v. American Suzuki
Motor Corp. the court went even further in holding that jurisdiction was
evident from the initial settlement letter without any further concessions
39
by the plaintiff.'
D.

The Circuit Split

While recent district courts applying the pre-Lowery preponderance
of the evidence standard are still justifying their holdings under Lowery,
the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that district courts should not speculate by reading into the pleadings allegations or even settlement offers in
defendant a detailed settlement letter justifying the settlement demand, defendant proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional amount had been met).
133. Ralph, 2009 WL 3200680, at *3.
134. See also Devore v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. 3:09cv690, 2009 WL 3110814, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2009) (holding that the defendants met their burden by presenting both
interrogatory responses and a demand letter that helped establish jurisdiction).
135. Rollo, 2009 WL 1684612, at *3.
136. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1213 n.63 (1 th Cir. 2007).
137. Id. at 1211 (holding that jurisdiction is evident from the removing documents or remand is
appropriate).
138. No. 09-0119, 2009 WL 1598428, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 3, 2009); see also Boland v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., No. l:09cv976-MHT, 2009 WL 4730681, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec 7, 2009)
(holding that plaintiff's settlement demands were enough to meet the jurisdictional burden
because "the documents, read together, represent Boland's own specific and reasonable estimates
of the lost rental income for his properties").
139. 529 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2008); see also McCollough v. Plum Creek
Timberlands, L.P., No. 3:09cv1038, 2010 WL 55862, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2010) (citing
Bankhead, the court held that here, jurisdiction was even more readily deducible from the removal
documents than in Bankhead because the settlement offer indicated a strong analysis of the case
by the plaintiff).
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deciding whether the amount in controversy has been met. 14' This
uncertainty over how to apply the preponderance burden is nothing new

in this circuit. As evidenced in this note, district courts since before
Lowery have been attempting to juggle what type of evidence they can
evaluate in determining the jurisdictional amount. The Lowery court
even stated that it was at a loss for how to apply the preponderance of
the evidence standard because district courts in the Eleventh Circuit
have consistently and erroneously applied it to the naked-pleading context. 14 But interestingly enough, the Eleventh Circuit is not the only
circuit to entertain some insecurity in applying the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Indeed, the Lowery court's uncertainty in applying
the standard only highlights the increasing circuit split over the defenwhen the plaintiff
dant's burden in proving the amount in controversy
42
fails to plead a specific jurisdictional amount.1
In the first instance, the Second and the Third Circuits have been
plagued with inconsistencies in applying a specific standard. The Second
Circuit, for example, has been known to use the preponderance of the
14 3
evidence and the reasonable probability standard interchangeably.
Under the reasonable probability standard, a much lighter burden, if it
appears that there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff can
44
recover more than the jurisdictional amount, the case is removable.
Under either standard, however, the defendant must present enough
140. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214.
141. Id. at 1210.
142. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hanna Steel Corp., et al., v. Lowery, et al., 76 USLW
3633 app. at 66a, 79a (U.S. Apr. 1. 2008) (No. 07-1246); id at 18 (noting that the uncertainty over
a removing defendant's burden of proof can be traced to confusion over the interpretation of Red
Cab and McNutt); see also Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Samuel Basset v. KIA Motors of Am., 357 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2004)) (distinguishing Red Cab
and McNutt based on whether the jurisdictional dispute involves factual matters); Guglielmino v.
McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 702-05 (9th Cir. 2007) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring)
(attempting to harmonize both McNutt and Red Cab); Meridian Security Ins. Co., v. Sadowski,
441 F.3d 536, 540-41 (7th Cir. 2006) (clarifying the confusion between the McNutt and Red Cab
standards).
143. See United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. Centermark
Props. Meridian Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a defendant has the
burden of proving the amount in controversy by a reasonable probability and must do so by a
preponderance of the evidence); McLoughlin v. People's United Bank, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 70,
72 (D. Conn. 2008) (citing both the reasonable probability and the preponderance of the evidence
standard); Setlock v. Renwick, No. 04cv0079e, 2004 WL 1574663, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 21,
2004) (same); Royal Ins. Co. v. Jones, 76 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204 (D. Conn. 1999) (same); Michael
W. Lewis, Comedy or Tragedy: The Tale of Diversity Jurisdiction Removal and the One-Year
Bar, 62 SMU L. REV. 201, 210 (2009) (noting the Second Circuit's uncertainty over either
standard); see also Cheung v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that "the standard governing a removing defendant's burden where the plaintiff
challenges the jurisdictional amount appears to be open in this circuit").
144. Ball v. Hershey Foods Corp., 842 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Conn. 1993).
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proof that the jurisdictional allegations have been met.' 4 5
The Third Circuit, interestingly enough, also exhibited serious
irregularity in applying both the preponderance of the evidence standard
and the reasonable probability standard.' 4 6 In fact, some district courts
have "acknowledged that the Third Circuit itself has not clearly indicated the standard to be applied and, therefore, have developed their
own approaches."' 4 7 But unlike the Second Circuit, who used both standards interchangeably, the Third Circuit applied them separately. It was
not until Samuel Basset v. KIA Motors of America that the Third Circuit
finally realized it was in dire need of a standard courts could consistently
apply. 4 8 There, the court held that in disputes over factual matters, the
McNutt preponderance of the evidence standard should be used.' 4 9 Once
findings of fact have been made, the case should only be remanded if it
appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover more than
the jurisdictional amount.15 0 In other words, whatever facts are not in
dispute should be held to the legal certainty standard.' 5 ' In Frederico v.
Home Depot,'52 the Third Circuit ultimately adopted this inverted legal
certainty test and denied the motion to remand because the pleadings did
not show to a legal certainty that the plaintiff could not recover more
53
than the jurisdictional amount.1
Second, it is important to note that the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits all apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, even
where the plaintiff alleges an amount less than the jurisdictional
amount. 54 Their reasons for doing so benefit the defendant, who in
cases with indeterminate damages faces a difficult obstacle in removing. 15 5 For instance, in De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., the Fifth Circuit held
145. Lewis, supra note 143, at 210.
146. See Samuel Basset, 357 F.3d at 396 (quoting Irving v. Allstate Indem. Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d
653, 654 (E.D. Pa. 2000)) ("Courts in the Third Circuit are unencumbered by consistency in their

characterization of a defendant's burden of proving the amount in controversy on a motion to
remand.").
147. Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Mercante
v. Preston Trucking, Co. Inc., No. 96-5904, 1997 WL 230826, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
148. 357 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2004). But see Penn, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (discussing the
external circuit split and the Third Circuit's disagreement on amount in controversy burdens).
149. Samuel Basset, 357 F.3d at 398.

150. Id. at 397-98.
151. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
152. 507 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2007).
153. Id. at 199.
154. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2007) (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring) (noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard strikes a balance between
plaintiff's right to remain in state court and defendant's right to remove to federal court).
155. Id. at 703 (citing De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995)) (holding
that imposing a more stringent burden on defendants may fail to protect defendants from plaintiffs
who fail to specify a damage amount in the complaint in order to avoid federal jurisdiction).
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that the plaintiffs claim remains correct until the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional amount has been
met. 156 Removal is then proper unless the plaintiff proves to a legal certainty that recovery cannot exceed the jurisdictional threshold. 15 7 On a
similar stance, the Seventh Circuit in Meridian Security Insurance Co. v.
Sadowski determined that when the defendant establishes that the
amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the jurisdictional
amount, removal is proper unless the plaintiff shows to a legal certainty
that federal jurisdiction is improper.' 5 8 Citing Meridian, the Tenth Circuit quickly followed pace in McPhail v. Deere & Co., when it held that
the proponent of federal jurisdiction must prove contested facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.15 9 Once he does so, he is entitled to
remain in federal court unless it is legally certain that less than $75,000
160
is at stake.
Further, although circuits vary as to what standard to apply to a
complaint seeking an unspecified amount of damages, those circuits that
do apply the preponderance of the evidence standard apply it very incon" ' This phenomenon "more than probably" stems from that
sistently. 16
fact that McNutt provided little guidance as to how much and what type
of proof was sufficient and competent enough to meet the preponderance
of the evidence standard.16 2 As such, applying a preponderance of the
evidence is usually undefined and requires either a different set of evidentiary rules per circuit or, in some instances, requires a defendant to
abide by the ambiguous "more likely than not" standard.
For instance, according to the Fifth Circuit, if the jurisdictional
amount is not apparent from the face of the complaint, the court then
considers the removal petition, affidavits, and other summary judgmenttype evidence. ' 63 Following the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also promotes the introduction of summary judgment-type evidence in meeting
156. De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412.
157. Id.
158. 441 F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2006).
159. 529 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2008).
160. Id. at 954.
161. Id.; Meridian, 441 F.3d at 541-42; Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d
373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997); Allen v. R&H Oil and Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995).
162. McNutt v Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind. Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) ("If his
allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in an appropriate manner, he
must support them by competent proof. And where they are not so challenged the court may still
insist that the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, andfor that purpose the
court may demand that the party allegingjurisdictionjustify his allegations by a preponderance
of evidence.") (emphasis added); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1210 (11 th
Cir. 2007) (finding precedential reliance on McNutt problematic because the language describing
the preponderance of the evidence standard was only dicta).
163. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335.
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the jurisdictional threshold." 6 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand,
considers a broader array of evidence that includes, but is not limited to,
interrogatories and admissions, the face of the complaint, settlement
demands, informal estimates, and affidavits. 65 After agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit adopted this same evidentiary standard but expanded it by allowing the possibility of post-removal evidence and discovery in support of jurisdiction. 6 6 On the other end of the
spectrum, however, and similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
allows only the introduction of evidence relevant to the time of
67
removal.'
This confusion over what evidence to consider under the preponderance of the evidence standard is further evidenced by the fact that
some circuits assess the standard under a "more likely than not" threshold. 168 Taking into account that different circuits provide for different
loads of evidence in meeting the preponderance of the evidence standard, the "more likely than not" threshold is at times ambiguous, confusing, and, in reality, not a workable threshold. Indeed, the Lowery court
noted that circuits have assessed the preponderance of the evidence standard under the "more likely than not" threshold because of the confusion
that commonly arises when considering evidence under the preponderance of the evidence standard. 169 Its meaning therefore varies and consequently, defendants' ease of removal ultimately depends on a circuit's
viewpoint, whether flexible or not.
V.

AFER-THOUGHT/RECOMMENDATION

It is clear that a circuit-wide uniform preponderance of the evidence
standard would certainly be more effective. In fact, other circuits have
already recognized the need for a uniform burden and have begun the
move toward one standard by implementing a cohesive preponderance
of the evidence standard for their district courts to apply.' 7 0 As such, it
164. Singer, 116 F.3d at 377.
165. Meridian, 441 F.3d at 541-42.
166. McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 954 (10th Cir. 2008).
167. Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 2007); Everett v. Verizon
Wireless, 460 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2006); Caudill v. Ritchie, No. 09-28 ART, 2009 WL
1211017, at *4 (E.D. Ky. May 1, 2009) (concluding, similar to the Lowery court, that if
defendants wanted to remove to federal court, they should have conducted discovery in state court
prior to removal).
168. Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, 230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that under the
preponderance of the evidence standard, a defendant must prove it is "more likely than not" that
the plaintiff's claims exceed the jurisdictional amount); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102
F.2d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357
(11 th Cir. 1996) (same); Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
169. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1209 n.57 (11th Cir. 2007).
170. McPhail, 529 F.3d at 953; Meridian Security Ins. Co., v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541
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seems reasonable to note that in the first instance, the Eleventh Circuit
must also come together and implement a more effective standard that
district courts could and will follow. In doing so, the circuit should take
note that one of the major reasons other circuits have been successful in
creating a uniform standard that district courts actuallyfollow is because
they have created a preponderance of the evidence standard that benefits
defendants' chances of removal.
For instance, similar to the Eleventh Circuit in Lowery, the Tenth
Circuit in McPhail confronted the problem with the lack of evidence
available when a removal petition is filed. At that point, the question
primarily becomes how a defendant could possibly prove facts in support of the amount in controversy when pre-removal discovery is probably insufficient, when the plaintiff will most probably not respond well
to interrogatories, and when the chances of post-removal discovery are
nonexistent, since the plaintiff will immediately move to remand.' 7 ' The
Tenth Circuit further agreed with the Seventh Circuit in Meridian in
holding that the proponent must prove contested factual assertions to
remain in federal court. This, the Tenth Circuit said, "explains the proper
role of the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard, and how defendants may have a chance at satisfying it."' 72
Specifically, Judge Easterbrook in Meridian relied on the requirements set out in Rules 8(a)(1) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in holding that jurisdiction is a "legal conclusion, a consequence of facts rather than a provable fact."' 7 3 In other words, once the
defendant proves contested factual assertions, the case should remain in
federal court unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claim does not
exceed the jurisdictional amount. Unlike Lowery's preponderance of the
evidence standard, any uncertainty about the plaintiffs claims exceeding
the jurisdictional threshold is not enough to justify dismissal.' 7 4 In creating this burden, Judge Easterbrook noted that its requirements harmonized the Supreme Court's decisions in McNutt and Red Cab: it placed
the burden of removal on the defendant, the party seeking jurisdiction,
(7th Cir. 2006); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995); United Food and
Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. Centermark Props. Meridian Square, Inc.,
30 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1994).
171. McPhail, 529 F.3d at 953; see also Noble-Allgire, supra note 94, at 731.
172. McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 954 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Meridian, 441 F.3d at
540-43).
173. Meridian, 441 F.3d at 541. The Court relies on these Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
primarily to show that jurisdiction, or a lack thereof, can be established through the use of the fact
pleading process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (stating that a short and plain statement is all that is
necessary to establish jurisdiction); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) (noting that a party may present the
defense of subject-matter jurisdiction by motion).
174. Meridian, 441 F.3d at 543.
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and then allowed the plaintiff to defeat jurisdiction by proving that its

claim cannot exceed the jurisdictional amount. 75 The Fifth Circuit in De
Aguilar and Judge O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit's concurrence in
Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.1 76 were also quick to note that a
stricter burden on defendants would allow plaintiffs to get away with
pleading manipulation that would ultimately allow them to remain in
1 77
state court and recover a larger sum on remand.

The Second Circuit, on the other hand, successfully applies a standard very similar to the "more likely than not" standard, the reasonable
probability standard, in helping defendants remove to federal court. The

reason for its success, however, is that as opposed to most other circuits
that have applied or continue to apply the ill-defined "more likely than
not" standard or the inconsistent preponderance of the evidence standard, including the Eleventh Circuit, 7 8 the Second Circuit actually specifies the evidence threshold defendants must meet under the
preponderance of the evidence standard. For example, in United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, the Second Circuit held that the defendant
must prove through a preponderance of the evidence that it is reasonably
probable that the plaintiffs claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount. 17 9
To a certain extent, defendants are more aware of how much evidence is

necessary to prove the amount in controversy-whatever makes it reasonably probable. 180 This burden has been recognized as not overly

175. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2007) (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring) (citing Meridian, 441 F.3d at 543).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 704; De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995). But see
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting the possible benefit of
pleading manipulation under the inverted legal certainty test-in situations where the plaintiff
fails to plead a certain amount of damages, the plaintiff will usually continue to withhold
information about the value of her claim with the purpose of keeping herself out of federal court;
but, in withholding all this information, the pleadings only show that it is legally certain the
plaintiff could not recover more than the amount in controversy and the plaintiff will ultimately
have to remain in federal court); see also Lewis, supra note 143, at 212.
178. Although the Eleventh Circuit in Lowery credited the Ninth and Sixth Circuit's
application of the "more likely than not" threshold to an uncertainty over the preponderance of the
evidence standard, the Eleventh Circuit itself actually applied the "more likely than not" threshold
in Tapscott when it first applied the standard in the circuit. This fact may well have contributed to
the confusion over how to apply the standard properly. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77
F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996).
179. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. Centermark Props.
Meridian Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1994).
180. See Tongkook Am. Inc., Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
Moore v. Betit, 511 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that the party invoking federal
jurisdiction has the burden of proving that it is reasonably probable that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional minimum)).
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heavy1 8 1 and can be achieved through the allegations on the face of the
83
complaint, demand letters,' and affidavits. 1

On simple policy grounds, a more relaxed preponderance of the
evidence standard is further justified by the fact that in setting a lower
standard of proof for indeterminate complaints, federal courts have
relied on striking a proper balance between the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. 84 According to the Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott,

"[w]here a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand for damages, a
lower burden of proof is warranted because there is simply no estimate
of damages to which a court may defer."1 85 The Fifth Circuit first
adopted the more lenient preponderance of the evidence standard in
Garza because applying the legal certainty standard to situations where
damages are difficult to calculate and specify would almost always preclude defendants from removing in appropriate cases.' 8 6 In other words,
a lower jurisdictional burden is warranted where plaintiffs do not claim a
specific amount of damages because it would not otherwise be possible
for defendants to remove. In support of this contention, the Fifth Circuit
in De Aguilar reiterated the fact that a plaintiff should not be allowed
to
1 87
destroy a defendant's choice to remove under the removal statute.
Generally speaking, benefitting a defendant's chance of removal is
further justified by Congress's enactment of the diversity jurisdiction
statute.188 Many scholars and federal judges agree that in granting diver181. Ball v. Hershey Foods Corp., 842 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Conn. 1993) (citing Moore, 511
F.2d at 1006).
182. Royal Ins. Co. v. Jones, 76 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204 (D. Conn. 1999).
183. United Food, 30 F.3d at 305-06.
184. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Jessee,
supra note 9, at 679; Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV.
609, 621 (2004) ("In interpreting the removal statutes as amended by these acts, federal courts
continued to reflect Justice Story's view that removal was a procedural mechanism intended to
ensure that plaintiffs and defendants had equal opportunities to invoke the federal jurisdiction of
the federal courts ....").
185. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11 th Cir. 1996); see Gafford v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 160 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The 'legal certainty' test in removal cases
arose in a context where the plaintiff's prayer for damages in state court exceeded the federal
amount-in-controversy requirement. In such a case as that, it is proper to presume that the
plaintiff's prayer is an appropriate presentation of potential damages because the damages sought
are against the plaintiffs interests. There can be no such presumption where there is no specific
prayer for damages. Thus, the 'legal certainty' test should not be applied to situations ... where
damages are unspecified."); see also Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376
(9th Cir. 1997); Garza v. Bettcher Indus. Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
186. Garza, 752 F. Supp. at 756.
187. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Borlens v. Redman
Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1985)). But see Jessee, supra note 9, at 680 (noting that
in favoring a less strict jurisdictional burden in De Aguilar, the Fifth Circuit ignored the fact that
removal statutes should be construed narrowly).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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sity jurisdiction to the federal courts, Congress hoped to reduce the
potential for state bias against out of state litigants.' 8 9 This position has
withstood much criticism, though. For instance, according to the American Law Institute ("ALI"), when one considers the increased mobility in
society, the potential for state bias is minimal if not absent.' 9 ° Justice
Frankfurter, a long time enemy of the diversity statute, also noted the
statute's potential to over-crowd the federal docket. '9 ' However, in Burford v. Sun Oil, Frankfurter did ultimately note that whether the federal
courts should be relieved of diversity jurisdiction was a matter for Congress to decide, not for judges, "as the duty of the judiciary is to exercise
the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred". 92 Based upon this premise, it is difficult to wonder why judges aggressively decide removal
issues under the diversity statute.
One, and possibly the best, explanation has been proposed by Professor Scott R. Haiber:
Rather than seeking to interpret removal statutes in a manner consistent with equity and common sense, courts apply a strict construction
to removal statutes even when it leads to patently unfair results.
Rather than seeking to achieve a statutory construction that furthers a
longstanding congressional desire for fair and uniform procedures,
courts justify confusion and arbitrary results with the assurance that
removal must be limited. Moreover, many courts seem entirely undisturbed by the fact that defendants' constitutionally based removal
93
rights are routinely destroyed by lawyers' procedural games.1
Heiber proposes three important reasons federal courts have created
189. See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
§ 3601 (4th ed. 2009); Benjamin J. Conley, Will the Real Party in Interest Please
Stand Up?: Applying the Capacity to Sue in Diversity Cases, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 675, 682
(2008) (noting that most scholars agree that the purpose for the enactment of the diversity statute
was the fear of bias against out of state citizens); see also Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87
("lit is not less true that the constitution ... views with such indulgence the possible fears and
apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states."); S. REP. No. 85-1830
(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102 (amending the diversity statute to classify
corporations as citizens of a state and noting that "[t]he underlying purpose of diversity of
citizenship legislation . . . is to provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the
prejudices of local courts and local juries by making available to them the benefits and safeguards
PROCEDURE

of the federal courts").
190. Conley, supra note 190 (citing AM.

LAW INSTrr.,

JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF

106 (Official Draft 1969) ("[Nlone of the

significant prejudices that beset our society today begins or ends when a state line is traversed.")).
191. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58 (1954) (Frankfurter J., concurring)
("For the last ten years the proportion of diversity cases has greatly increased, so that it is safe to
say that diversity cases are now taking at least half of the time that the District Courts are devoting
to civil cases.").
192. Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315, 337, 348 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
193. Heiber, supra note 185, at 656-57 (citations omitted).
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a baseless presumption against removal: First, plaintiffs have a preferred
access to federal courts; second, the concept of federalism requires
removal from state court to be strictly construed; and finally, the limited
nature of federal jurisdiction.' 9 4 In rebutting the first presumption,
Heiber states that neither Congress nor the Constitution has ever given
plaintiffs preferred access to federal court.' 95 Specifically, he notes that
"[p]roviding plaintiffs with a superior right to select the judicial forum
elevates one party's strategic litigation preference over the structural
constitutional principle of equal justice."' 9 6 Next, in responding to the
federalism justification, Heiber makes it a point to note that removal can
in no way be at tension with the notion of federalism when it was an
essential component of the jurisdictional theme created by the Framers.' 97 Finally, similar to Frankfurter's Buford dissent, federal courts are
not adept to decide the nature of federal jurisdiction because under the
Constitution, Congress, not the judiciary branch, defines the limits of
federal jurisdiction.'9 8 In other words, federal courts should abandon
whatever beliefs they have against removal practice and stick to the
"long-held view that removal is a vital structural component of the
American judicial system empowered by the constitution.'' 99
VI.

CONCLUSION

While it has been proven that Lowery did significantly narrow the
preponderance of the evidence burden rendering it similar to the legal
certainty burden, the importance courts grant a defendant's removal
right is already being seen again in the Eleventh Circuit through the
plain and simple fact that district courts post-Lowery have expanded
Lowery's holding to assist those defendants who are reasonably entitled
to removal. 2°
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 657-62.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 663.

200. Although this departure may come as a surprise to many, in dicta the Lowery court itself
advocated a preponderance of the evidence standard that militated toward allowing some
breathing room in determining whether or not the amount in controversy will and can potentially
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. This breathing room may well be the reason why district courts
citing Lowery have taken the liberty of expanding Lowery's holding. See Lowery v. Ala. Power
Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1209 (11 th Cir. 2007) (holding that "the removing defendant must establish
the amount in controversy by '[t]he greater weight of the evidence, . . . [a] superior evidentiary
weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still
sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other"); see
also Allen v. Toyota Motor Sales, 155 F. App'x 480, 480-81 (11 th Cir. 2005) (holding that based
on the damage specifications in the removal notice, the amount in controversy more than probably
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Whether or not the Eleventh Circuit intended for the standard to be
extended on such grounds remains unknown. That the court even advocated this standard in the first place does, however, lead to the reasona-

ble conclusion that while it significantly narrowed the preponderance of
the evidence standard, the fear of deviating from well-established precedent barred the Eleventh Circuit from completely abandoning the preLowery preponderance of the evidence standard federal courts were
familiar with. This confusion over the preponderance of the evidence

standard is, as seen, nothing new in this circuit or other circuits, as different circuits apply a different evidentiary burden under that standard.
While the most effective solution to this confusion is certainly a
uniform circuit-wide preponderance of the evidence standard that benefits defendants, as evidenced by the Tenth, Seventh, Fifth, and Second

Circuit's experience, the road to uniformity must first begin within the
Eleventh Circuit itself. Based on the Eleventh Circuit's and other circuits' advancement of a more lenient preponderance of the evidence

standard, the truth of the matter may be that courts have an inherent fear
of abandoning removal burdens that will completely disadvantage
defendants. To the discontent of many plaintiffs, that district courts in
the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Lowery with such breadth ulti-

mately goes to show that in the indeterminate complaint context,
whether or not as a result of human nature, courts will inevitably by and
large give defendants the benefit of the doubt in removing. In other

words, if the Eleventh Circuit does not jump on the bandwagon soon
enough, it is going to be left behind.2" 1
exceeds jurisdictional amount); Henderson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 070799cgm, 2009 WL
959560, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 2009) (citing Allen and Lowery in finding that "[a]lthough the
evidence before the court is not impregnable, 'a fair and impartial mind' would clearly find that
years of pain in addition to the other elements of damage that the plaintiffs claim add up to a
dispute of at least that amount"); Spivey v. Fred's Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275 (M.D. Ala.
2008) (agreeing with the damage specification test set out in Allen but declining to apply it to the
facts of the case at bar).
201. The Eleventh Circuit recently reconsidered their decision in Lowery in Pretka v. Kolter
City Plaza 1I, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11 th Cir. 2010). There, in an opinion by Judge Carnes, the court
held that Lowery was limited to its facts because it specifically involved the removal procedures of
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2007). Id. at 757, 762. The court found that the question in Lowery was
"how to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard in the 'fact-free context' of that
particular case." Id. at 753. And that a different question was presented "when a removing
defendant makes specific factual allegations establishing jurisdiction and can support them (if
challenged by the plaintiff or the court) with evidence combined with reasonable deductions,
reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations" because that type of reasoning was not
similar to speculation. Id. at 754. Most importantly, the court refused to follow Lowery's dicta
limiting the type of evidence a defendant can present in establishing the amount in controversy
requirement because: 1) it has never been the jurisdictional rule that a defendant can remove a
diversity case only when the plaintiff is the source of all the evidence; and b) Lowery undermines
Congress's intentions to benefit defendants with the removal statute. Id. at 764-68.

